Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin have put forward a number of alleged counterexamples to the transitivity of the relation "all things considered better than".
2 sitivity. B is worse than A, C is worse than B, D is worse than C ... and Z is worse than Y, yet Z is better than A. 3 Temkin provides a very similar case:
[C]ompare two lives, A and B. Suppose that both A and B are lengthy-perhaps, indeed, very lengthyand that A and B are similar, except that A contains two years of excruciating torture, B four years of torture whose intensity is almost, but not quite, as bad as A's. [...] Claim 2: There is a spectrum of distinguishable unpleasant experiences, ranging in intensity from extreme pain to very mild discomfort.
Claim 3: A very mild discomfort for any amount of time is preferable to extreme pain for a significant amount of time.
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Ken Binmore and Alex Voorhoeve claim that Rachels' and Temkin's general argument is invalid; Claims 1 to 3 do not entail intransitivity. 7 The argument is, according to
Binmore and Voorhoeve, "a version of Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise". If Claim 1 is interpreted in either of these ways, the following is a suitable formulation of Claim 2:
Claim 2*: For any intensity level i (except the lowest level, if there is one), there is a distinguishable intensity level j = i − ε.
Claims 1* and 2* do not together entail that there is a sequence of the required kind.
To see this, suppose that there are numbers x and y, x > 2y, such that x represents the intensity level of an experience of extreme pain, while y represents the intensity level of a very mild discomfort. For every positive integer n > 1, there might be a distinct intensity level z = y + (1/n)x. In this sequence, obviously, z > y, for any n. Thus, Claims 1* and 2* could be satisfied although the sequence never reaches an experience of intensity y. Transitivity may then hold even if Claim 3 is true.
Binmore and Voorhoeve apparently read Claim 1 as Claim 1*. There is, however, nothing in Rachels' or Temkin's discussion that excludes the alternative, Claim 1** interpretation. Concerning Temkin, there is even some slight evidence in its favour.
With respect to the quoted example, he writes that "the intensity of the unpleasant ex-periences [is] slowly, but steadily, decreasing in each successive life". 9 Describing the decrease as "steady" seems to suggest that it is Claim 1**, rather than Claim 1*, that he has in mind.
In any case, we may leave exegetical questions to one side, and decide to understand Claim 1 as Claim 1**. This makes Rachels' and Temkin's argument valid. Claims 1** and 2* do together imply the existence of a sequence of the required kind. Claim 1** allows us to assume that the difference in intensity is the same between any two adjacent experiences in the sequence. This ensures that we will get from an intensity x to an intensity y experience in a finite number of steps. Although Claim 1** is logically stronger than Claim 1*, its intuitive plausibility is, as far as I can see, equally great.
There is also another problem with Binmore's and Voorhoeve's objection. Interpreting Claim 1 as Claim 1* does not block the inference to intransitivity, unless we presuppose an infinite number of distinguishable intensity levels. But it is implausible to assume that humans have sufficiently fine powers of discrimination to ensure the existence of such an infinity of levels. This intuitive argument will, of course, gain in strength if one is able to give a plausible example of such a sequence. Rachels and Temkin maintain that they have, indeed, provided such examples.
In conclusion, Rachels' and Temkin's argument against the transitivity of betterness cannot be dismissed as a version of Zeno's paradox. There are several responses available to this charge. Whether some version of the argument is actually sound is another matter.
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